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The State first claims that ScuderPs pro sc motion io dismiss w as not preserved for 
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Scuderi preserved this issue for appeal by filing pro se a motion to dismiss (R. 289-90). 
Therefore, the State's assertion that Scuderi has failed to argue plain error is irrelevant 
(Br. of Appellee at 5-6). 
Scuderi's motion to dismiss was preserved for appeal purposes, as he repeatedly 
reminded the trial court of his 120-day disposition and filed pro se a motion to dismiss 
(See Addenda in Br. of Appellant). Thus, Scuderi's motion "put[] the judge on notice of 
the asserted error" and certainly raised the trial court's "consciousness" of its mistake, 
thereby giving the trial court an opportunity to correct its error. State v Davis, 2004 UT 
63,1 13 ,_P.3d__. 
The State also claims "defendant never moved to dismiss the case, so the trial 
courl never made a good cause determination pursuant to a motion to dismiss" (Br. of 
Appellee at 14). Although Scuderi's motion to dismiss was not in the usual form trial 
courts are accustomed to, he placed on the title of his letter to the trial court "Motion to 
dismiss 120-Day Disp." and specifically stated, "I would like to submit to the court this 
request as a motion and hope the court will recognize this as such...." (R. 290). 
Therefore, Scuderi asserts that his letter was a proper motion before the trial court. 
Accordingly, the State's claim that the reason for the trial court's failure to consider the 
motion to dismiss is not supported by the record. 
B. The trial was not brought within the 120-day disposition period. 
Next, the State contends that the entire 17 month period in which the State failed 
to bring Scuderi to trial is supported by good cause delay, thereby tolling the statutory 
120-day period (Br. of Appellee at 17). However, the record clearly indicates that this 
approximate 500-day delay was not entirely the result of "good cause shown in open 
court." See Utah Code Annotated § 77-29-1(3). 
1. The Detainer Period Expired April 12, 2001. 
First, the State asserts that it is irrelevant that Scuderi did not waive his 120-day 
disposition during the February 9, 2001 hearing because his attorney requested a 
continuance (Br. of Appellee at 18). The State relies on § 77-29-1(3), which states "the 
defendant or his counsel ... may be granted any reasonable continuance." However, the 
State's argument is unsound. 
At the hearing, Scuderi's trial counsel requested a continuance (R. 351 at 3). 
However, Scuderi told the trial court that he would not consent to a further continuance 
of his trial (R. 351 at 4-5). The trial court ignored Scuderi's objection and ordered a 
continuance anyway. The State argues that trial counsel has authority to override his 
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation. Moreover, the State asserts 
it was permissible for the trial court to ignore Scuderi's objection and instead continue 
the trial at the request of his trial counsel, even though Scuderi expressed in open court 
that he did not want his trial counsel to continue the trial date. 
Utah law clearly holds that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation.../' Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 
1.2. Moreover, the comment to Rule 1.2 states, "The client has ultimate authority to 
determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by 
law...." Additionally, a lawyer has a duty of loyalty to his client which "is so essential to 
the proper functioning of the judicial system that its faithful discharge is mandated not 
only by the Rules of Professional Conduct, but also, in criminal cases, by the Sixth 
Amendment right of a criminal defendant to the effective assistance of counsel. State v. 
Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1994). 
In this case, it is evident that Scuderi's trial counsel ignored his decision to not 
continue the trial date any further. Thus, trial counsel breached the duty of loyalty he 
owed Scuderi and violated the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. Accordingly, the 
trial court also erred in continuing the trial date without Scuderi's approval. Therefore, 
this delay, caused by the trial court's error, was not "good cause" for extending the trial 
date beyond the 120-day disposition period. Thus, the convictions must be dismissed 
with prejudice because the prosecutor failed to have the case tried within the allotted 
time. 
2. The August 30, 2001 Continuance Was Not Supported by Good 
Cause 
Next, the State argues that the additional "continuance of the trial beyond August 
30, 2001 was the result of a decision by defense counsel and the court" and thus fits 
under the good cause exception (Br. of Appellee at 19). Further, the State argues "the 
delay was caused by defense counsel's decision to withdraw" (Br. of Appellee at 21). 
However, the continuance was not at the request of trial counsel and it was error for the 
trial court to order substitute counsel because there was no conflict. Therefore, this 
continuance was not the result of "good cause" and accordingly, went well beyond the 
120-day disposition period. 
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The record clearly indicates that the trial court continued the trial date due to a 
supposed conflict of interest with LDA (R. 331 at 17-18). Moreover, as the State admits, 
the trial court suggested that LDA withdraw from representing Scuderi (R. 331 at 15; Br. 
of Appellee at 20). Thus, trial counsel withdrew only after the trial court requested his 
withdrawal; trial counsel did not withdraw on his on initiative as the State suggests. 
Moreover, there clearly was no conflict of interest between LDA and Scuderi and the trial 
court erred in continuing the trial date way beyond the 120-day disposition period. 
The State asserted on August 16, 2001 that a conflict of interest existed that 
required LDA to withdraw from representing Scuderi (R. 325 at 46). Not only did trial 
counsel vigorously deny that a conflict existed, but Kreeck Mendez (the attorney with 
whom the conflict supposedly existed) filed an affidavit with the trial court adequately 
explaining that no conflict existed (R. 168-73; 325 at 48, 52, 55). At that point, even the 
State agreed that there was no need to disqualify LDA (R. 331 at 17-19). It is certain that 
the prosecutor failed to show in open court that a conflict existed, and the State is still 
unable to show that a conflict existed that required the trial court to advise LDA to 
withdraw its representation. Therefore, the trial court erred in continuing the trial date 
further and the State failed to have the case tried within the allotted time period. 
3. The Lengthy, Additional 77 Day Delay Was Not Supported By 
Good Cause. 
Concerning the further continuance from October 4 until December 19, 2001, the 
State asserts it was acceptable for the trial court to continue the trial an additional 77 
days, even though it had almost been one full year since Scuderi filed his 120-day 
disposition, without showing on the record why such another lengthy delay was 
necessary (Br. of Appellee at 24-25). 
The State's reliance on State v. Houston, 2003 UT App 416, 82 P.3d 219, is 
misplaced. In Houston, defense counsel stated he was unavailable for trial the week of 
April 1st, and the trial court stated it was unavailable the weeks of April 8th and 15th. Id. 
at % 12. The 120-day disposition period was to end on April 13. Id. at ^ 10, n.2. After 
some discussion, the trial court set the trial date for April 24, just 11 days outside of the 
120-day period. Id. at f 12. The trial court recognized this delay, but stated on the 
record: 
Let's set this for April 24, 25[,] and 26. And the record will reflect that [the 
beginning date] is past the 120-day [period]. The [c]ourt knows that as we are 
doing it and [that] it's past the 30 days for the expert-witness notice. But it is the 
soonest I can set it on the calendar, given that the defense counsel is not going to 
be here the first week of April and the [weeks of the] 8th and 15th are master 
calendars for the [c]ourt. 
Id. (emphasis in original). This Court found that this brief 11 day delay, attributable in 
part to defense counsel's absence and the trial court's unavailability discussed in the 
record constituted "good cause". Id. at Xi 13-14. 
Relying on Houston, the State incorrectly asserts that whenever defense counsel 
causes even a minor delay due to his schedule, "the resultant delay is not attributable to 
the State" even though the trial court fails to explain in "open court" why no earlier date 
is available for trial (Br. of Appellee at 24-25). 
Houston is not analogous to the facts of this case and does not stand for the 
proposition the State asserts. At the scheduling hearing on October 4, 2001, the trial 
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court stated only that two dates were available: one in November and the other December 
19 (R. 363 at 3). Trial counsel said she had a conflict with the November date but not the 
December date (R. 363 at 3). Unlike Houston, the State failed to bring up the 120-day 
disposition and the trial court failed to consider in "open court" the 120-day disposition. 
The trial court made no mention of the fact that either date fell outside of the allotted 
120-day period, nor did it discuss in "open court" why no earlier date was available. 
Thus, the State's interpretation of Houston is incorrect. 
The mere fact that trial counsel had a conflict on the November date does not 
mean that the trial should have and could have been scheduled earlier. Trial counsel was 
ready for trial as early as October 4 (R. 363 at 3). It cannot be argued in good faith that 
the additional 77 day delay is entirely attributable solely to Scuderi because his trial 
counsel had a conflict with some date in November. See Coleman, 2001 UT App 281 at <[| 
6 (any delay must be "a relatively short delay"). The State failed to call to the trial 
court's attention that the trial should be scheduled as early as possible, considering the 
fact that the 120-day disposition was filed November 7, 2000, almost one full year 
earlier. This failure to ensure that the case be brought to trial within the 120-day period 
requires a dismissal of the convictions with prejudice. 
4. The Next 92 Day Delay Did Dot Constitute Good Cause Shown in 
Open Court 
The State's last argument regarding the 120-day disposition is that the final 92 day 
delay from December 19, 2001 to March 20, 2002 was reasonable (Br. of Appellee at 26-
27). However, the State once again fails to demonstrate that "good cause" shown in 
"open court" justified such a lengthy delay. 
The State claims it was reasonable not to schedule a two-day trial during the 2002 
Winter Olympics (Br. of Appellee at 28). While it may not have been "practicable" to 
schedule this two-day event during the Olympics, the trial court failed to explain why the 
trial could not be scheduled before the Olympics. The State expressed that it would be 
ready for trial the second week of January 2002 (R. 356 at 5). However, the trial court, 
without giving any explanation in "open court," stated, "we can't go then, practically 
speaking" (R. 356 at 5). The Olympics did not begin until February 8, 2002, a month 
later than the State said it would be ready to start (Br. of Appellee, Addendum B). The 
State's assertion that the trial court's explanation, "we can't go then, practically 
speaking," is a sufficient explanation "on the record why trial could not be held earlier 
than March 20th" is not supported by the record (Br. of Appellee at 27-28). The trial 
court gave no explanation why it could not begin trial a month before the Olympics. It 
merely stated it could not do it. Thus, the State once again failed its "affirmative 
obligation to ensure that good cause" for such an prolonged continuance be shown in 
"open court." See State v. Wagenman, 2003 UT App 146, \ 15, 71 P.3d 184. 
Finally, the State's assertion that the trial could not be held during the Olympics is 
not supported by the memorandum the State offers pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence (Br. of Appellee at 29, n.5). That memorandum clearly states that the 
trial court is only "encourage[d] to avoid jury and criminal trials" and further 
acknowledges that "some hearings and their time frames are mandated by law" (Br. of 
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Appellee, Addendum B). Scuderi asserts that the 120-day disposition required this matter 
be heard within that time period, and considering the already lengthy delay caused by the 
State in bringing this case to trial, the Olympics did not constitute "good cause" to justify 
the delay of an additional 92 days. 
Therefore, the State failed to comply with its statutory mandate to ensure that this 
case was brought to trial within 120 days, absent "good cause" shown in "open court." 
Accordingly, this Court should dismiss his convictions with prejudice. 
C. In the alternative that this issue was not preserved, trial counsel was 
ineffective. 
There can be no argument that if the State failed in its duty to bring the case to 
trial within the 120-day disposition period, then Scuderi's trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to file a motion to dismiss. 
Moreover, the State's assertion that Scuderi's trial counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to file a motion to dismiss because defendants are entitled only to "reasonably 
effective assistance" and "not perfect advocacy" is comical. (Br. of Appellee at 15, n.4). 
Without question, if counsel fails to file a motion to dismiss—which should have been 
granted—based on a violation of the 120-day disposition, after the defendant has 
repeatedly requested counsel to do so, such incompetence is ineffective assistance of 
counsel if the disposition period has expired. 
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II. THE POLICE ACTED IN BAD FAITH BY DESTROYING 
POTENTIALLY EXCUPLATORY EVIDENCE 
The State first contends that Scuderi asserts that this issue should be reviewed de 
novo (Br. of Appellee at 33). This is not entirely correct. This Court in State v. Holden, 
964 P.2d 318, cert denied 922 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998), underscored the necessity of 
carefully reviewing a trial court's determination of police misconduct. This Court 
ultimately determined that this issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 324. 
Because the trial court in this case failed to make any factual findings regarding the 
police misconduct, Scuderi reminds the Court of the necessity of carefully reviewing all 
the facts relating to the destruction of the evidence before Scuderi had the opportunity to 
examine it. In fact, this is exactly what Holden requires. 
The State further contends that because the trial court failed to issue any findings 
of fact regarding the bad faith of the police, this Court should "resolve[] any factual 
discrepancies in favor" of the trial court (Br. of Appellee at 34). Scuderi asserts this 
position is inherently unfair and against the policy of encouraging a complete record for 
appeal purposes. It is apparent that the trial court found that the police did not act in bad 
faith; otherwise it would have been bound to rule in Scuderi's favor regarding his motion 
to dismiss. But to abandon a careful review of the evidence because the trial court failed 
to closely examine the facts or failed to place the findings of fact on the record would 
only encourage trial courts to not place any findings of fact on the record since this would 
essentially preclude a reversal on appeal. Scuderi asserts only that this Court should 
carefully look at all the evidence and then determine whether the trial court abused its 
discretion. 
issue on appeal and because the trial court failed to make any findings on the record, this 
Court must assume that the officers examined all or most of the items for fingerprints and 
d •" ' 1 " - : . | \ > ' . . ! C - . ' M ' - ! : l - :. \\ j h ' U ^ J l . tO ^ 1 H l i f t 
least. 
It is unnecessary for the record to obtain "Aiwichmeni A" and "Attachment B" for 
this Court to properly ;..-•. i. .. . -i;;\ Iwo items taken 1n;;i. ;he garage were tested for' 
fingerprii its. In tl le State's response to Sci ideri's i i lotioi 1 to dismiss, the State confii med 
the fact thai onl\ \\\o items were tested for fingerprints by not disputing Scuderi's 
allegation (R. 119), Moreover, during the motion to dismiss hearing, Scuderi asserted 
that onlv two itei i is w ere tes • ' •• -! Ini^crpr1^^ -m.-5 -j<v ^! i'- "• ^mk^ • *. id--"-, -,
 : •• 
testimony contradicting that claim <VR. 325 at 32, 41). Therefore, it is illogical to assert 
that 1iiL (rial court found that all or most of the items were fingerprinted when all of the 
was destroyed before Scuderi had a chance to test the items himself 
The State's next assertion that the officers did not act in bad faith by destroying all 
tl ic & > idei ice becai tse tl ie\ acted pi n si lai it to policy is i ic t dispositi\ e on 1:1 lis issue (Bi : f 
Appellee at 37-38). Just because police are following procedure does not mean that 
Scuderi's rights were violated. There have been numerous instances where officers were 
following standard police procedi n: es ai id. later coi irts have 1u w. :i:a1 conduct in violation 
1 1 
of the Bill of Rights. For example, in Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court determined that standard police 
inteiTOgation tactics, outlined in a variety of police manuals that advocated the use of 
physical and psychological coercion, violated a suspect's fundamental rights. Id. at 446-
448, 498-99. 
Instead of immediately destroying all the evidence, the police should have 
standard procedures implemented that allows exculpatory evidence to be preserved, at 
least until the exculpatory value can be determined. 
Accordingly, even if the police were following policy, Scuderi's rights were still 
violated because the police destroyed all the physical evidence without giving Scuderi the 
opportunity to have the items tested. By testing only two items and then destroying all 
the items without further testing, the police indicated by their own conduct that this 
evidence could form the basis for exonerating Scuderi. Therefore, the police acted in bad 
faith by destroying all the physical evidence. 
And while it may be true that by destroying the evidence, the officers also 
destroyed any potential inculpatory evidence (See Br. of Appellee at 38), this choice was 
made solely by the officers after already testing two items and finding no link to Scuderi. 
Scuderi had no say in the decision and should not bear the burden of the officers' actions. 
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III. SCUDERI WAS PREJUDICED BY TRIAL COUNSEL'S 
INEFFECTIVENESS 
i 'ikierthe totality ui'iln- circumstances, and considering the Prosecutor's 
}3i irp< >sefi il elicitatioi i of tl le fact tl lat Sci ideri w < is ii 1 pi isoi i, tl i.e c: >i itcoi i le of 1 he trial 
would have been different but for trial counsel's deficient performance. 
The State asserts that the numerous references to Scuderi's prison history were 
independent evidence" (Br. of Appellee at 43). However, these references to Scuderi's 
incarceration violated right to a fair trial and to a presumption of innocence. 
The only e\ idei ice cleai ly Hi ik iiig Sci idei i to the ci ii ne was the testimony of Felice 
Mahoney. There was little, if any physical evidence linking Seudcn \* j •. . rir- : of 
intending to operate a clandestine laboratnn. However, several witnesses contradicted 
Mahoney's testimony. i Im .^ i ^ main i^i.t hcloiv ihe jury was the credibility of 
Mahone** UT;I: • l \ • • v i M^. : .! •• .. • . • • . • ' ' 
repeated references to Scuderi's histor) of incarceration impermissibly impressed upon 
the iiiiiui. KH i!u ,i»u»is iluii Scuderi must be a person of low moral character, and thus 
capable of comi i litting tl: le crii i le cl lai ged ' 1 1 lis tainted Sc i idei Ps cl laractei , cat isii lg tl i,e 
jury to believe Mahoney's testimony over that of other witnesses contradicting her 
testimony. I herefore. these inappropriate references to Scuderi's incarceration violated 
1 lis i ights and thei e is a i easoi lable probability tl lai I: "i it f < ' i tl icse references, tl le ji n y 
w ould have acquitted Scuderi. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Scuderi asks 
this Court to reverse his conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2£fli day of August, 2004. 
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